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COMMENTS 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW - STOCKHOLDERS' REMEDIES FOR COR-
PORATE INJURY RESULTING FROM ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS: DERIVA-
TIVE ANTITRUST SUIT AND FIDUCIARY DuTY AcTION - The question 
of what remedies are available to a stockholder whose corporation 
has been injured or is threatened with injury by acts violative of the 
federal antitrust laws1 is largely unexplored. The staggering fines 
suffered by a number of corporations in the recent electrical indus-
try criminal antitrust convictions2 demonstrate, however, that the 
question is both timely and important. Moreover, its answer could 
have a great impact both upon the means of protecting corporate 
minority rights3 and upon the means of private enforcement of the 
federal antitrust laws.4 The stockholders' derivative suit5 affords 
l The most important of these are the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958); the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §~ 
12-27, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958); and the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). This comment deals only with problems 
raised by stockholders' actions based on violation of the federal antitrust laws. It should 
be noted, however, that such actions might also be predicated on the violation of state 
antitrust statutes. See, e.g., DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912 
(1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1938). 
2 Twenty indictments under the Sherman Act were returned, involving most of the 
nation's major electrical industry corporations. TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) 
,i 45,060, Cases 1496A, 1498, 1500, 1502, 1504, 1506, 1507, 1517, 1519, 1521, 1523, 1525, 
1527, 1529, 1539, 1541, 1548, 1550, 1558, 1566. Convictions were entered and sentences 
imposed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
February 6 and 7, 1961. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1961, p. 16, cols. 4-6. The General Electric 
Company, illustratively, was fined a total of $252,500. Ibid. The potential loss, however, 
is much higher, since the government and other parties allegedly injured by the illegal 
practices have already started to institute treble damage actions against the convicted cor-
porations. E.g., United States v. General Electric Co., TIW>E REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) 
,J 45,061, Case 1596 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
3 "We recognize that defense of a derivative suit [under the federal antitrust laws] 
... may be hard and expensive. But no substitute method of minority corporate super-
vision has yet been developed .... " Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 
198 (2d Cir. 1959) (Clark, J.). See generally Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit- Corporate 
and Individual Grievances, 33 YALE L.J. 580 (1924). 
4 See generally Note, 66 YALE L.J. 413 (1957); 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 1069 (1952). 
5 This comment is directed toward stockholder remedies for injury to the corporation. 
The derivative suit treated in the text is the appropriate remedy in this regard. To be 
distinguished from the derivative suit is the stockholder's private suit, whereby the stock-
holder, either individually or as a representative of all stockholders as a class, sues fOI' 
injury to himself as a stockholder. See 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS §§ 5908, 5911 
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1961). It is sufficient here to note that neither the individual nor 
representative stockholders' suit will lie under the federal antitrust laws where predicated 
on injury to his corporation. It has been uniformly held that the indirect loss the stock-
holder suffers from a wrong to the corporation - the reduction in the value of his stock 
and potential share in the corporate assets-is not injury to his "business or property" 
which would justify a treble damage action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th 
Cir. 1953). Nor is it "threatened loss or damage" justifying relief under section 16 of 
that act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan 
Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926). That the plaintiff stockholder owns all the stock 
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two remedies which deal with these two points respectively.6 
There are two general types of derivative action. One lies where 
the corporation has a right of action against any party, within or 
without the corporate structure, but is unable or unwilling to 
assert that right.7 This form of derivative suit could be brought 
under the federal antitrust laws for the various forms of relief 
specified therein against any party, either within or without the 
corporation, whose violation of those laws injures the corporation.8 
The second type of derivative action lies when any of those per-
sons in control of the corporation act inimically to its interests, in 
breach of their :fiduciary duties to the corporation, to hold them 
personally liable to it for the injuries resulting therefrom.9 Such 
a derivative suit could be brought against directors or officers of 
the corporation to hold them personally liable to it for injuries 
it sustains by reason of their having violated or caused the cor-
poration to violate the federal antitrust laws in breach of that 
fiduciary duty, or to restrain such violations.10 It is with these two 
actions that this comment is concerned.11 
I. STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. The Law Prior to 1953 
From the time private parties were given the power under the 
federal antitrust laws to enjoin the violation of those laws, the 
stockholders' derivative suit has apparently been an appropriate 
does not change the result. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. 
Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.), adhered to, 32 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), afj'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d 
Cir. 1940). See Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1017 (1942); Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 480 (1953). Of 
course, a stockholder can recover personally for any individual loss from an antitrust 
violation which also happens to injure his corporation. Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522 
(6th Cir. 1897). By hypothesis, individual and representative private suits do not lie to 
remedy breaches of fiduciary duty to the corporation discussed in section III of this 
comment. 
«I See generally 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 5850-6045. 
7 E.g., Greenwood v. Union Freight R.R., 105 U.S. 13 (1881). See 13 FLETCHER, op. 
cit. supra note 5, §§ 5850-52, 5951. 
8 E.g., Fanchon 8: Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F .2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953). 
See 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 5929. 
9 E.g., Ash wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1935). See 13 FLETCHER, 
op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 5850-52, 5951. 
lOE.g., Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 
1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). 
n It is important to distinguish these two stockholders' derivative suit remedies 
which arise out of the violation of statutes, such as the federal antitrust laws, which do 
not expressly create stockholder actions, from an action under a provision of a statute 
that does in terms create such a remedy. An example of the latter is section 16 (b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1958). 
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vehicle to obtain injunctive relief.12 But the same was not true 
with respect to the treble damage remedy. Due to the niceties of 
the historical distinction between law and equity it was estab-
lished, by two early Supreme Court cases, that a stockholders' 
derivative suit would not lie to recover treble damages under the 
antitrust laws. In 1916 Mr. Justice Holmes closed the door in 
Fleitman v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co.13 by holding that the treble 
damages provision was a legal remedy and would not lie in an 
equitable derivative suit which would deprive the defendants of 
their right to a jury trial on that issue. Mr. Justice Brandeis locked 
and bolted the door a year later in United Copper Sec. Co. v. 
Amalgamated Copper Co.14 by holding that a derivative action is 
purely equitable and that a plaintiff could not avoid the impact of 
the Fleitman case by attempting to bring such an action on the 
law side. Thus an impasse was reached which lasted until 1953. 
B. The Law Since 1953 
The procedural merger of law and equity was effected by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1939.15 The first stock-
holders' derivative suit to seek treble damages under the federal 
antitrust laws after that date was Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount 
Pictures,16 which came before the Second Circuit in 1953. The 
trial court dismissed the treble damage count, holding the Federal 
Rules to be of no avail since the issue of treble damages was "sub-
stantive" and therefore unaffected by the new rules.17 The Second 
12Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(dictum). The Fanchon rb- Marco case cites no prior case in which a derivative suit was 
brought for injunctive relief under the federal antitrust laws and no prior cases have 
been found. It has been asserted [Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 480, 483 (1953)] that such suits 
would not lie prior to the Fanchon rb- Marco decision, but the author cites only private 
stockholder action cases, which are wholly inapposite. See note 5 supra. A stockholder 
suing in the right of his corporation for threatened injury to the corporation would seem 
to qualify as a "person [or] ••• corporation ••• threatened [by] ••• loss or damage by 
a violation of the antitrust laws," 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958), and the 
difficulties encountered in seeking the treble damage remedy (see text accompanying note 
13 infra) would seem to present no problem with regard to the equitable injunctive rem-
edy. In any event, the Fanchon tr Marco case and every subsequent derivative suit which 
has sought injunctive relief have held that such relief is now obtainable in a derivative 
action. Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956); Schechtman v. 
Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453 (1956), afj'd, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957). 
13 240 U.S. 27 (1916). 
14244 U.S. 261 (1917). 
ll>FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
16202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953); 52 MICH. L. REv. 155 (1953); 49 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 383 
(1954); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1345 (1954). 
17 Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 
1952), 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 1069 (1952), rev'd, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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Circuit reversed, holding that the difficulty could easily be sur-
mounted by trying the issue of the plaintiff stockholders' right to 
sue to the judge and the question of damages to the jury. This 
sound result has been followed without dissent in all subsequent 
actions18 and now seems to be settled law. 
II. LIMITATIONS OF STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT UNDER THE 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 
The area under consideration involves the interplay of two 
relatively discrete bodies of law: corporation law and federal anti-
trust law. When the various requirements of corporate and anti-
trust law are taken into consideration, the apparently broad sweep 
of the Fanchon & Marco case will be found to be limited to cases 
involving a rather narrow fact situation. 
A. Suits To Redress Corporate Injury Resulting From 
Anti-Competitive Effects of Antitrust Violation 
I. Where Person Causing Violation Does Not Dominate Cor-
poration. When the corporation has a cause of action under the 
antitrust laws against one or more third parties who in no way 
dominate the corporation and its management, the decision 
whether to assert that cause of action would ordinarily be one 
solely within the discretion of the corporation's directors; assertion 
of the cause of action could be compelled by means of the stock-
holders' derivative suit only if it could be shown that this discre-
tion had been abused.19 When it is the corporation itself which 
has committed the antitrust violation, the corporation would have 
no cause of action under the antitrust laws for the simple reason 
that it has suffered no injury within the meaning of those laws.20 
The injurious effects of the anti-competitive acts in question are 
felt by the victims-competitors and the consuming public-not 
by their author. 
18 Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960); Gottesman v. General 
Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for interlocutory appeal denied, 268 
F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Kogan v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956); Gom-
berg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (dictum). The recent developments 
concerning derivative suits have not, of course, altered the rule that individual and repre-
sentative stockholders' suits will not lie under the federal antitrust laws. Bookout v. Schine 
Chain Theatres, 253 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1958). See note 5 supra. 
10 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPORA110NS §§ 5945-60 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1961). The 
derivative suit is most often available and necessary where the wrongdoer against whom 
the corporation has a cause of action dominates the corporation and thereby blocks the 
corporation's bringing suit. Id. § 5945. See also Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Gas. Co., 330 
U.S. 518, 522-23 (1946) (dictum). 
20 See text accompanying notes 24-30 infra. 
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2. Where Person Causing Violation Dominates Corporation. 
Where, however, the corporation is injured by anti-competitive 
acts for which persons are responsible who also dominate or con-
trol the corporation, the stockholders' derivative suit under the 
antitrust laws will be available to redress this injury. The Fanchon 
& Marco case itself arose in such a situation. There A corporation 
and B corporation formed C corporation, each taking back fifty 
percent of C's stock and each naming two of C's four directors. 
B corporation engaged in a restraint of trade by which C was 
victimized and made to forego profits. Corporation A then 
brought an action against B under the antitrust laws for treble 
damages and for an order enjoining B from voting its stock in 
C. A's petition contained three counts, all based upon the same 
antitrust violation: (I) a claim by A individually in its capacity as 
stockholder in C; (2) a claim by C corporation itself; and (3) a 
claim by A as a stockholder of C suing derivatively to assert C's 
claim. The first count was dismissed under the familiar rule that 
a stockholder's private action does not lie under the antitrust 
laws.21 The second was likewise rejected because A could not 
authorize suit in C's corporate name without the concurrence of 
B and since B was defendant in the suit, such concurrence was not 
forthcoming. But the third count, asserting a derivative right of 
action as a stockholder of C, was upheld. The injury to corpora-
tion C caused by defendants' conduct was direct and of the very 
type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent or redress. And 
a derivative suit under those laws was the appropriate - indeed, 
the only - way in which to invoke their protection. Because the 
wrongdoer itself controlled the management of the injured cor-
poration, the latter was otherwise powerless to assert its cause of 
action. 
Thus a derivative action under the federal antitrust laws to 
redress corporate injury flowing from the anti-competitive efjects 
of an antitrust violation will be available only where one or more 
of the violators dominates the plaintiffs' corporation. The 
Fanchon & Marco case and all subsequent actions22 for this type of 
injury have shared this factual situation. 
21 See note 5 supra. 
22 Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956); Rogers v. American 
Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 
661 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for interlocutory appeal denied, 268 F.2d 194- (2d Cir. 1959); Kogan 
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 
132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (dictum). 
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B. Suits To Redress Corporate Injury Resulting From Legal 
Consequences of Corporation's Own Violation of Antitrust Laws 
All that has gone before has concerned corporate losses result-
ing when the corporation is the victim of an antitrust violation. 
But corporate injury can also result indirectly from an antitrust 
infringement when the corporation is itself the violating party. 
The corporation is then susceptible to losses in the form of fines, 
single damages, treble damages, and litigation expenses assessed 
or incurred in suits brought against it by the government, by 
private parties, or by both, whether terminated by judgment, con-
sent decree, or settlement.23 Of course, such losses do, in a broad 
sense, arise out of an antitrust infringement. The question then 
arises whether a stockholder of the guilty corporation could bring 
a derivative action under the antitrust laws to make the corpora-
tion whole by holding liable for the resulting injury the directors 
or officers who caused the corporation to violate those laws. 
Several considerations seem to indicate that such a suit would not 
be available in this situation. 
The federal antitrust laws provide two exclusive remedies to 
private parties: (1) an action for treble damages in favor of "any 
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,"24 and (2) injunctive 
relief "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the 
antitrust laws."25 The injury or damage contemplated by the 
statutes has been held to be only such as directly flows from injury 
to the competitive system in that sector of the economy at which 
the illegal acts are aimed.26 The classic statement of this rule is 
!!3 Injunctions against further illegal practices and divestiture of assets the holding 
of which has been found illegal complete the possible consequences attendant on antitrust 
infringement. See Clayton Act§ 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958), 
and Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). Since these remedies 
merely return the corporation to the status quo before the violation, no "loss" is incurred 
in the sense in which that word is used in this discussion. 
24 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). 
2t; 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). 
26 E.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. 
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d 
Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.) (private action by stockholder for diminution in value of his 
stock resulting from antitrust violation to corporation); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. 
Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955) (suit by patentee for loss of royalties due 
to violations against licensee); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) 
(private stockholder claim). For an excellent discussion of this rule by Chief Judge 
Yankwich, see Hess v. Anderson, Clayton &: Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 475-78 (S.D. Cal. 1957). 
Injury to consumers as well as to competitors is, of course, the type of direct injury at 
which the antitrust laws aim. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar 
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1948). 
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contained in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.21 There 
a conspiracy was alleged among the various "majors" of the motion 
picture industry aimed at destroying the various "independents" 
of the industry. Plaintiff labor union alleged that as a result of 
this antitrust violation its members were unable to obtain employ-
ment on as favorable conditions as had previously been possible. 
The court dismissed plaintiff's action for treble damages and in-
junctive relief because the injury alleged was not of the type con-
templated by the antitrust laws. The court stated: 
"The [plaintiff's] ... connection with the alleged illegal 
conspiracy is not such as would bring them within the con-
templation of the anti-trust law. The entire import of the 
conspiracy, insofar as competitive conditions are concerned, 
is the attempt to destroy the Independents. . . . The damage 
alleged to have been suffered by appellants does not flow from 
any injury to the competitive situation .... 
"[I]n order to state a cause of action under the anti-trust 
laws a plaintiff must show more than that . . . the conspiracy 
was in restraint of trade and that an act has been committed 
which harms him. He must show that he is within that area of 
the economy which is endangered by a break.down of competi-
tive conditions in a particular industry. Otherwise he is not in-
jured 'by reason' of anything forbidden in the anti-trust 
laws."28 
The injury in the situation under discussion is believed to be of 
like nature. Rather than having been injured by the anti-com-
petitive effects of its own acts, the corporation has suffered loss due 
to the legal consequences of having engaged in such acts. The 
injury - damages and penalties - is causally but not legally con-
nected to the antitrust violation. In Gomberg v. Midvale Co.20 
stockholders sought in a derivative suit to enjoin their directors 
from consummating a proposed merger between the corporation 
and one of its competitors. Plaintiffs claimed that the merger 
would be in violation of the federal antitrust laws and would 
subject the corporation to the threat of loss from damages and 
penalties in potential civil and criminal antitrust actions against 
the corporation. Judge Ganey dismissed the claim, citing the 
Loew' s case: 
27193 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). 
28 Id. at 54-55. 
29157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955). 
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"In sum the injury which the [antitrust] laws envision is the 
injury to the economy of the plaintiff, by virtue of restrictions 
of trade or something that proximately flows from it ... . 
" ... The money which [plaintiffs' corporation] ... may, 
in some future time, be required to pay as treble damages or 
penalties as the result of possible actions brought against them 
for violations of the antitrust laws, is not threatened harm or 
damages which proximately flow from the violations within 
the meaning of Section 16."30 
By parity of reasoning, such damages and penalties when actually 
assessed are not the type injury to the corporation's business or 
property required by statute for imposition of treble damages. 
Moreover, any recovery by the corporation under the anti-
trust laws would be in treble the amount of the prior fines or 
damages. In the case of fines this would mean that the directors 
would be forced to pay three times that which the court in the 
prior action had determined to be the appropriate penalty for the 
violations. With regard to treble damages recovered in a prior 
action, the effect would be to assess the directors nine times the 
damage caused. The former would over-penalize the directors; 
the latter would overcompensate the corporation. If the treble 
damage provision is compensatory in nature,31 there is trebling 
because the unliquidated nature of the actual damages makes proof 
of their full amount almost impossible. Here, however, the maxi-
mum damages would be fixed and certain; no trebling would be 
necessary to approximate full compensation. Indeed, to treble 
already-trebled damages would be to render them punitive, con-
trary to the intent of Congress hypothesized above. Even if a 
contrary hypothesis is true - that treble damages were intended 
by Congress to be punitive in nature - a second trebling would 
unjustifiably increase the sanction which Congress had thus 
deemed proper to impose. Thus an action of this nature might 
well be foreclosed on the additional ground that it would be out 
of harmony with the remedial scheme established in the federal 
antitrust statutes. 
A final consideration is that the antitrust laws do not seem in-
tended as vehicles for the adjustment of intracorporate loss-bear-
ing. Support for this conclusion seems evident in the fact that the 
80 Id. at 142. Accord, Fein v. Security Banknote C.O., 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
81 Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-trust Act Penal or Compensatory? 
28 KY. L.J. 117 (1940). 
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antitrust laws contain separate and distinct provisions concerning 
violations by corporations, on the one hand, and by individual 
corporate officers, on the other. 
Thus an action is not available under the antitrust laws by 
which a corporation can hold the responsible officers liable for 
losses flowing from the legal consequences of their acts which 
caused the corporation to violate the antitrust laws. An alterna-
tive remedy does, however, appear to be available. This alterna-
tive, which will be explored in the remainder of this comment, is 
directed specifically to the type of loss here involved, provides for 
single rather than treble damages, and is expressly designed to 
adjust intracorporate equities. 
III. STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE FIDUCIARY DUTY ACTION 
AGAINST DIRECTORS OR OFFICERS VIOLATING OR CAUSING THEIR 
CORPORATION To VIOLATE THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 
Directors and officers owe their corporation a fiduciary duty to 
promote its best interests and keep it from loss.32 It is beyond the 
scope of this comment to cover all facets of this relationship and 
its consequences. Several features, only, are here material. Man-
agement owes the corporation a duty of reasonable care in the 
direction of its affairs.33 It must refrain from engaging, or causing 
the corporation to engage, in illegal or ultra vires activities.34 
Violating or causing the corporation to violate a statute involves 
a breach of fiduciary duty if the director knew or should, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, have known that the statute would be 
violated.35 A stockholders' derivative suit will generally lie to 
hold the directors personally liable to the corporation for all loss 
sustained by it which is causally connected with a statutory viola-
tion36 and to restrain a prospective or continuing violation.37 
82 See generally 3 FLEI'CHER, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS §§ 990, 1100 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 
1947). 
33E.g., Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918). 
See 3 FLErCHER, op. cit. supra note 32, §§ 1029-64. 
84 See 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 32, §§ 1021-28; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 65, 
106 (1946). 
85 Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum&: Transp. Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 
934 (1941); Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935); Williams v. McDonald, 
37 N.J. Eq. 409 (1883); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS§ 155 (2d ed. 1949). The fact that the statute 
violated does not in terms provide for such liability is not controlling. Thompson v. 
Greeley, 107 Mo. 577, 17 S.W. 962 (1891). Cf. note 11 supra. 
86E.g., Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938). 
87 E.g., DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y. Supp. 912 (1937), aff'd, 
276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1938). 
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Three elements are necessary to establish such a cause of action: 
that the statute was violated, that the directors knew or should 
have known their acts were illegal, and that the corporation was 
thereby injured. This comment will explore whether such a 
"fiduciary suit" will lie when the statute violated is one of the 
federal antitrust laws. 
A. The Fiduciary Suit Based on the Antitrust Laws Distinguished 
From an Action Under the Antitrust Laws 
It is imperative at the outset to distinguish clearly between 
an action under the antitrust laws and an action against directors 
or officers for a breach of their fiduciary duty which is founded on 
their violation of the antitrust laws. An action under the anti-
trust laws lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.38 Such an action seeks to vindicate a right created by a 
body of federal statutes and enforceable only in a federal court 
and to receive remedies provided by those statutes and no others.39 
A suit based on breach of fiduciary duty vindicates a right created 
by the common law of the state; the remedies are provided by 
state law and such suits lie primarily in state courts.40 The federal 
antitrust laws are involved, if at all, only to the extent that their 
violation provides one substantive element of the state cause of 
action: the illegality of the acts complained of. Thus when the 
federal antitrust laws are relied upon merely to establish the 
element of illegality necessary to show a breach of fiduciary duty 
and not to seek recovery under the antitrust laws, no federal ques-
tion is raised upon which to predicate federal jurisdiction.41 Simi-
larly, if a fiduciary suit is in a federal court on diversity grounds 
alone, the federal court applies state law and its use of the anti-
38Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising 
Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436 (1920); Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 
51 N.E.2d 681 (1943); McMaster v. Ford Motor Co., 114 S.C. 100, 103 S.E. 87 (1920); Gold 
Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 59 N.J. Super. 6, 157 A.2d 30 (Super. Ct. 1959); 
Clayton v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Williamson v. Columbia 
Gas &: Elec. Co., 27 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), afj'd, 110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 
U.S. 639 (1940); American Ref. Co. v. Gasoline Prods. Co., 294 s:w. 967 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1927); Venner v. New York C. &: H.R.R., 177 App. Div. 296, 164 N.Y.S. 626 (1917), afj'd 
mem., 226 N.Y. 583, 123 N.E. 893, cert. denied, 249 U.S. 617 (1919). 
30 A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn &: Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925); Meyer v. Kansas City So. 
R.R., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 
F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), afj'd, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956). 
40 Meyer v. Kansas City So. R.R., supra note 39. 
41 Ibid. See also Annot., 14 A.L.R2d 1185 (1950). 
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trust violation is limited to the same extent the state court's would 
be.42 
B. The Effect of a Prior Adjudication of Illegality Under the Act 
It has been noted above that the plaintiff stockholder must 
prove three elements to maintain his fiduciary action: violation of 
the antitrust laws, the particularized scienter or negligence re-
quired, and causally-connected damages. What would be the 
effect upon the proof of these three elements of a prior adjudica-
tion in a federal court of the illegality of the acts complained of in 
the fiduciary action? 
I. The Issue of Illegality. By far the greatest impediment to 
the successful maintenance of a fiduciary action for violation of 
the antitrust laws has been the difficulty, real or imagined, in 
establishing the requisite element of illegality by proof in a state 
court of the violation of federal statutes.43 Since the plaintiff in 
the prior action could never be or represent the stockholders' 
corporation, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not generally 
be available to make the prior adjudication of violation binding 
on the defendant directors on the issue of illegality.44 It is true 
that the corporation is the real party in interest in the fiduciary 
action and that both the corporation and the directors and officers 
are likely to be joined as parties defendant in the antitrust action. 
It is further true that coparties can be later bound by collateral 
estoppel but only as to issues on which they took adverse positions.4G 
By no means is the requirement of adverseness satisfied concerning 
the issue of violation of the antitrust laws as between the corpora-
42 Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955). This would also appear 
to be true where a derivative fiduciary suit is joined with an action under the federal 
antitrust laws which confers federal question jurisdiction on the federal court. E.g., 
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for interlocutory 
appeal denied, 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959). 
43 See Gomberg v. Midvale Co., supra note 42 (applying Pennsylvania law); Clayton 
v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Hoffman v. Abbott, 180 l\fisc. 
590, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 
(1941). Compare Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. 
Ct. 1942), afj'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). 
44 Cf. Kessler v. Fligel, 240 App. Div. 232, 269 N.Y. Supp. 664, appeal dismissed, 264 
N.Y. 689, 191 N.E. 628 (1934). See generally Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 
HARv. L. R.Ev. I (1942). The rule in California, however, would make the prior adjudica-
tion of illegality binding on the directors who were joined as defendants in the prior 
action. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 
892 (1942). 
45 RF..sTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942); Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 
65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 818, 860-61 (1952). But see 36 GEO. L.J. 441 (1948) which urges a 
contrary result, apparently overlooking the requirement of adverseness. 
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tion and its officers and directors joined as defendants in an anti-
trust action. Section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act46 is likewise of no 
avail. That section provides that a judgment obtained by the 
United States in an antitrust action shall be prima facie evidence 
against the defendant in any action brought by any other party 
"under said [antitrust] laws" growing out of the adjudged viola-
tion.47 But the fiduciary duty suit does not arise under the anti-
trust laws. As a practical matter, however, the prior adjudication 
will be most persuasive authority in the fiduciary suit. A state 
court must, in deciding an issue arising out of a federal statute, 
look to federal law.48 The finding of a violation of the federal 
antitrust laws by a federal court in a prior action involving the 
same conduct by the same defendants would doubtless be most 
persuasive to the state court on the issue of illegality in the 
fiduciary action. However, the state court ·will not be able to rely 
upon a federal court determination of the antitrust violation issue 
as binding on it by res judicata or otherwise. The state court will 
therefore not entertain this type of action unless it conceives itself 
to possess the power to interpret the federal antitrust statutes. 
2. The Issue of State of Mind. Where the alleged illegality 
consists of the violation of a statute, plaintiff must show that the 
director knew or should have known he was violating or causing 
the corporation to violate the act.49 Actual intent to commit an 
act kno-tvn to be illegal is always sufficient.50 Where this intent is 
lacking, plaintiff must prove that had the director used reasonable 
care he would have known the act was prohibited. 51 The state of 
mind required to be sho-tvn to find a violation under the antitrust 
laws is often markedly different. Negligence is never a factor. 
The intent required to constitute a violation of most of the statutes' 
provisions is merely the general intent to do the act later held to 
46 38 Stat. 7111 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958). 
47 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
48 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Moser, 275 U.S. 133 (1927); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264 (1821). See also Note, 48 CoLUr.r. L. REv. 943 (1948). 
40 See cases cited in note 35 supra. Where the statute clearly and unambiguously 
relates to the duties of corporate officers or directors, there is authority to the effect that 
mere violation thereof conclusively establishes a breach of fiduciary duty. E.g., Broderick 
v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y. Supp. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The federal antitrust stat-
utes are not, of course, of this nature. 
1iO Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935); Medford Trust Co. v. 
McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649 (1935); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & 
Transp. Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1941). 
51 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), 
aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). 
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be illegal.52 This is demonstrably quite different from the intent 
to do an act known to be illegal.153 In short, a prior adjudication 
of illegality not only is not binding, but also has no necessary 
relevance to the determination of the issue of intent or negligence 
in the fiduciary suit.154 Negligence is material in one and im-
material in the other; "intent" is not necessarily required in either 
and to the extent it may be present in both, it may well be tested 
by different criteria. 
3. The Issue of Damages. Breach of fiduciary duty is not 
actionable unless the corporation has suffered or is threatened with 
damage directly attributable thereto.155 The treble damages, fines, 
and litigation costs incurred in a prior adjudication are clear, 
definite, and easily proved losses to the corporation. Since the 
breach alleged in the fiduciary action consists of precisely those 
acts which led to such losses in the prior antitrust action, they are 
not only recoverable but would usually constitute the upper limit 
of the recovery.56 Indeed, this ability to recover the losses suffered 
by the corporation in a prior antitrust suit is the principal ad-
vantage which the fiduciary action has over the derivative suit 
under the antitrust laws which cannot recoup these losses. And 
while the stockholder may well not desire, by use of an anti-
trust suit, to plunge his corporation into antitrust litigation, when 
another has successfully done so it is clearly to the stockholders' 
interest to hold the delinquent directors or officers liable to the 
corporation for its resulting losses. 
C. Case Law on the Fiduciary Suit Involving an Antitrust 
Violation 
Relatively few cases have squarely presented the question 
whether a fiduciary action will lie where the breach of duty alleged 
52 Specific intent must be shown to make out an attempt to monopolize under § 2 
of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). United States v. Columbia 
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Swift &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928). For the 
other criminal provisions a general intent to do the illegal act is all that is required and 
it need not be shown that the defendant knew the act to be illegal at the time he com• 
mitted it. United States v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949); 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 51 F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C. 1943). 
53 See text accompanying note 102 infra. 
54 Cf. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 640 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
55E.g., Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1941). The Diamond 
case enunciated the damage requirement and said further that damage could not be 
inferred from the mere fact of violation of the federal antitrust laws. 
56 Clayton v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Cf. Sellers v. 
Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So. 2d 747 (1954) (tax penalty); Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kings• 
bury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938) (tax penalty); Hackner v. Van Wyck, 324 Ill. App. 
521, 58 N.E.2d 315 (1944) (fine; nonsuit on technical pleading grounds). 
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consists solely of a violation of the federal antitrust laws. Such 
authority as there is, despite some confusion, indicates that the 
action is maintainable. 
1. The Early Federal Cases. In 1914 the issue whether a 
violation of the federal antitrust laws constituted a breach of 
fiduciary duty which would support a stockholders' derivative suit 
based on traditional equitable principles, as distinct from an action 
based on antitrust laws themselves, was first raised in De Koven v. 
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry.67 The plaintiff minority stockholder there 
sought to restrain the majority stockholders of his corporation 
from merging with competitors. One count of three was predi-
cated on the ground that the merger would violate the Sherman 
Act. Despite its recognition of the fact that only the United States 
had, under the terms of the act, the power to enjoin its violation, 
the court held this count stated a good cause of action, reasoning: 
"The plaintiffs contend that the bill is not a suit in equity 
under the Sherman Act .... [This] contention is correct. The 
present suit is one by a dissenting minority stockholder to 
restrain the majority stockholders from accomplishing what 
is asserted to be an illegal or ultra vires act. It is, therefore, a 
well recognized species of general equitable jurisdiction, and 
not a mere statutory remedy conferred by the antitrust law . 
. . . [T]he fact that ... [the Act provides a separate remedy of 
which he is unable to avail himself] cannot be held to deprive 
an individual of an equitable remedy which was open to him 
before and independent of the statute .... [T]hat the illegal or 
ultra vires act is made so only by the statute [ cannot change 
the result] .... If it be an illegal or ultra vires act, however 
made so, a minority stockholder has ... a ... remedy of which 
he is not deprived by the creation of a statutory . . . remedy 
... of which he is not permitted to avail."58 
This early case clearly and properly distinguished the essential 
difference between an action under the statute and one for breach 
of fiduciary duty founded on the violation of that statute. It 
properly recognized that a court's inability to grant relief under 
the former in no way precludes its maintenance of the latter since 
the rights sought to be vindicated and the relief sought spring 
from different sources. And, finally, it understood that their in-
terrelation lies in the fact that proof of violation of the antitrust 
acts is a requisite of both. The confused state of the law in this 
117 216 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). 
118 Id. at 957-58. 
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area has resulted largely from a lack of appreciation by state courts 
of these several factors. 
In 1931 the cases of Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R.59 and 
Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry.60 extended the reasoning of De Koven 
to fiduciary actions for damages resulting from alleged violations. 
Both actions were started in state courts and removed to the federal 
court. In both, motions to dismiss were made on the ground that 
the state courts had no jurisdiction to grant relief under the federal 
antitrust law and that therefore the federal court obtained none on 
removal. Both motions were denied for reasons illustrated by the 
court's language in Hand: 
" 'It is now settled law that the remedies provided by the 
[Sherman] Act ... for enforcing the rights created by it are 
exclusive ... .' This declaration, however, is of no present aid 
to defendants, for the reason that plaintiff is not here seeking 
to enforce a right created by that act. On the contrary, he is 
seeking merely to redress an injury to the corporate defendant 
as a result of an effort on the part of the defendant directors 
to accomplish a public ·wrong. There is therefore no occasion 
to measure plaintiff's remedial rights by the statutory penalties 
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.''61 
The court in Guiterman made the implication express: 
"There is nothing . . . to warrant . . . the inference that the 
[Supreme Court has] excluded a state court from jurisdiction 
as to all rights which might relate to the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act. 
"[T]he issue is whether the defendant directors committed 
an ultra vires act .... The particular ultra vires act alleged to 
have been committed arises out of the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act. The Supreme Court of the State of New York 
certainly has jurisdiction in causes in which stockholders 
charge directors with malfeasance. That such malfeasance 
may arise out of a violation of a federal statute should not 
deprive the state court of jurisdiction. . . . 
"I conclude, therefore, that the state court had jurisdiction 
over the subject-matter of this suit.''62 
In both the Hand and Guiterman cases, the federal district 
courts felt they had federal question jurisdiction because of the 
59 48 F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931). 
60 55 F.2d 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). 
61Id. at 713-14. 
62 Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851, 853, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1931). 
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necessity to decide whether the federal antitrust laws had in fact 
been violated even though the actions were not brought under the 
antitrust laws. This proposition was expressly disapproved five 
years later by the Second Circuit in Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry.63 
The Meyer case presented essentially the identical cause of action 
asserted in Hand and Guiterman and so the court, finding no 
diversity, dismissed the action for want of federal jurisdiction.64 
An analysis of these three cases would seem to indicate that the 
fiduciary suit is based on a theory of liability arising out of state 
common law, creating a remedy available in state courts, even 
though the illegal act on which it relies consists of a breach of a 
federal statute. 
2. The State Court Cases. Of the few state court fiduciary 
suits which have been predicated on antitrust violations, several 
evidence an apparent inability on the part of the court or counsel 
to analyze correctly the issues involved in the action or to appre-
ciate its potential utility. For example, the difficulty in Hoffman 
v. Abbott,65 in which plaintiff was nonsuited, lay clearly with 
counsel's drafting of the three causes of action. He alleged, in 
substance, (1) that the directors had conspired with each other to 
effect a monopoly resulting in listed actual damages to the corpora-
tion, (2) that the corporation had been indicted for violation of 
the federal antitrust laws, and (3) that the directors knowingly 
had violated the Robinson-Patman Act.66 Nowhere did plaintiff 
allege that the violations of the antitrust acts themselves con-
stituted a breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore the court, without 
considering this possibility, nonsuited plaintiff since there was no 
other ground from which a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties 
could be implied. In Diamond v. Davis61 counsel seemingly 
failed to plead sufficient facts to prove an alleged violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act; the court properly held a consent decree 
obtained by the United States would establish neither the statutory 
violation nor the facts showing any injury flowed therefrom - two 
essential elements of the cause of action. 
The most disturbing case is Clayton v. Farrish.68 There it was 
alleged that the defendant directors caused the corporation to enter 
into a cartel arrangement. The corporation agreed to a consent 
63 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936). 
64 See also Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 1185 (1950). 
65180 Misc. 590, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
66 49 Stat. 1526 (1936); 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). 
67 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1941). 
os 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947). 
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decree under the federal antitrust laws. As a result, the corpora-
tion suffered substantial injury in lost profits, fines, and litigation 
expenses. The plaintiff stockholder sought to hold the directors 
liable in the amount thereof. Two breaches of fiduciary duty were 
alleged: (1) that the directors had served the interests of the other 
corporation when these conflicted with those of their own corpora-
tions, and (2) that the acts were illegal because in violation of the 
antitrust laws. The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds, 
inter alia, that the court was without jurisdiction of the subject 
matter because the suit was predicated upon the federal antitrust 
laws. The defendants urged in support of this motion that the 
state court was without jurisdiction to determine whether the 
directors' acts violated the antitrust acts and that a "determination 
by this court that the agreements in question did, in fact, con-
travene the federal antitrust laws is . . . a condition precedent to 
the granting of the relief demanded." To this contention the 
court, in denying the motion to dismiss, stated succinctly, "I do not 
agree. . . . Even after eliminating from . . . the complaint the 
irrelevant allegations that the cartel agreement violated the federal 
antitrust laws . . . the remaining allegations state a cause of 
action .... "69 It is easy to agree with the court that the nonstatu-
tory allegation stated a cause of action, that the ruling on the 
motion was correct in result, and that all the damages alleged in-
cluding those directly attributable to the consent decree were 
proper elements of recovery. In view of the separate ground the 
statutory violation allegation was unnecessary, but was it "ir-
relevant"? The cases cited in support of the dictum do not sustain 
it.70 The whole thrust of the court's reasoning is contained in this 
brief passage: 
"[L]iability cannot be imposed on defendants by this court 
merely because they violated the federal antitrust laws. The 
basis of their liability must be acts which fail to conform to 
th . fid . d " 71 eir uciary uty .... 
It is abundantly clear that the court either did not realize that a 
statutory violation itself could be a breach of duty or else, while 
69 Id. at I 46, 73 N .Y .S.2d at 737-38. (Emphasis added.) 
70 The court relied principally on Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 51 N.E.2d 681 
(1943). That case is wholly inapposite for two reasons: (1) It was an action under the 
federal antitrust laws and so, of course, the state court had no jurisdiction. See text 
accompanying and cases cited in note 38 supra. (2) It was not a suit based on breach of 
fiduciary duty. Thus the court in Clayton failed to make the fundamental distinction 
described in section III-A of this comment. 
71 Clayton v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 153, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727, 744 (Sup. Ct. 1947). 
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accepting that principle, felt that a state court was without power 
to decide whether the directors' acts in fact violated a federal 
statute. If the former is true, the case may be dismissed as ill-
considered. 72 However, the validity of the latter alternative should 
be examined, for this proposition was adopted by the court in 
Gomberg v. Midvale Co.73 as a basis for decision. Gomberg v. 
Midvale Co., as noted above, was a stock.holders' derivative action 
to enjoin the common directors of their corporation and a compet-
ing corporation from consummating a proposed merger alleged to 
be violative of the federal antitrust laws. Relief was sought pri-
marily under the laws themselves. But there was also diversity of 
citizenship and the stockholders prayed that the court retain 
jurisdiction if it found against them on the federal count and, 
sitting as a state court, restrain the merger as illegal under the 
federal antitrust laws and hence as an ultra vires act which, if 
permitted, would be in breach of the directors' fiduciary duty 
under state law. After holding against plaintiffs on the antitrust 
count, the court cavalierly disposed of the latter alternative con-
tention in two sentences: 
"It is claimed that the sale of assets will violate the federal anti-
trust law and is therefore ultra vires. Since the acts herein 
complained of are primarily acts which only a federal court 
could take jurisdiction of ... a Pennsylvania court would hold 
that redress if any would have to be relegated to the federal 
court under the antitrust laws."74 
This statement is, or should be, wrong. 
3. Does a State Court Have the Power To Decide Whether 
Acts Violate a Federal Statute Where This is a Necessary Element 
in a State Cause of Action? A state court has jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of a derivative action against directors and officers 
'12 Investment .Associates v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 
501 (1946), aff'd 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (1947), is believed to be subject to criticism 
on this ground. That case involved a derivative fiduciary duty action predicated on a 
violation of § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n (1958). It can be inferred from the report that it was urged upon the court that the 
statutory violation constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. The court, apparently failing 
to appreciate that fact, discussed only the question whether a private party could sue 
under the statute; this question it answered in the negative. While the answer given was 
correct, it was in response to the wrong question. 
73 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955). 
'14. Jd. at 142. 
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for breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation.75 When that 
breach is alleged to consist of a violation of the federal antitrust 
laws, such violation is, of course, an essential element of that subject 
matter.76 It is only to supply this element of illegality to the state 
action that recourse is required to the federal statute.77 No right 
created by that statute nor remedy provided thereby is sought. 
Can the declaration of illegality in the statute be separated from 
the rights and remedies which it creates? The acts themselves 
support an affirmative answer. Section 1 of the Sherman Act,78 
illustratively, simply provides that certain conduct "is declared to 
be illegal"; the rights and remedies flowing from the condition of 
illegality thus created are elsewhere specified. This condition of 
illegality attaches to the proscribed conduct regardless of those 
rights and remedies. A contract in restraint of trade does not 
vacillate between legality and illegality in proportion to its relative 
proximity to a federal courthouse.79 
Of course, the existence of this condition of illegality must be 
judicially determined before a defendant can be made to suffer 
any consequences attaching to it. Does a state court, for the pur-
poses of an action arising under its own law, have the power to 
adjudicate an issue by reference to the law of another jurisdiction, 
state, federal, or foreign? More specifically, does the state court, 
to supply the requisite element of illegality, have the power to ad-
judicate whether certain acts contravene a federal statute? The 
general statement of the question is answered affirmatively by ref-
erence to familiar principles of conflict of laws80 and to the practice 
75De Koven v. Lake Shore&: M.S. Ry., 216 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Guiterman v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry., 55 F.2d 
712 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 
U.S. 607 (1936); Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1941); Simon v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), afj'd mem., 267 
App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). 
76 E.g., Diamond v. Davis, supra note 75. 
77 E.g., Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 299 U.S. 
607 (1936). 
78 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U .S.C. § 1 (1958). 
79 Thus state courts have refused to enforce contracts found to be illegal because 
violative of the federal antitrust laws. See text accompanying and cases cited note 90 infra. 
so There are limitations, of course, on the types of foreign statutes a court will 
enforce. For example, penal statutes and statutes designed solely to further the govern-
mental interests of the enacting jurisdiction will not be enforced by a foreign forum. 
REsTATEMENT, CoNFLicrs OF LA.w §§ 610-11 (1934). These limitations, however, are in-
applicable to the derivative fiduciary duty action because that suit does not seek to enforce 
the statute on whose violation it is predicated. See section III-A of this comment; 
compare text accompanying note 86 infra. But see Steckler v. Pennroad Corp., 44 F. Supp. 
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of the federal courts in diversity cases.81 An affirmative answer 
to the specific question is indicated, for the De Koven and Meyer 
cases evidence not only that a court, state or federal, with equitable 
jurisdiction has the power to decide in a fiduciary suit whether the 
federal antitrust laws have been violated but also that this issue 
does not even raise a federal question. Moreover, a line of closely 
analogous authority also exists. It seems clear that a stockholders' 
derivative fiduciary suit ·will lie to hold directors or officers per-
sonally liable to their corporation for the amount of penalties 
assessed against it for violations of the federal tax statutes where the 
breach of fiduciary duty consists solely in the violation of those 
statutes.82 Two state supreme courts have reached this result.83 
Since res judicata was not applicable in either case to make binding 
on the state courts the prior finding by the Internal Revenue 
Service of a violation of the federal statute, the power to readjudi-
cate that issue and the exercise of that power by the state courts is 
implicit in their judgments. 
The state court, then, has the power to adjudicate, for its mvn 
purposes, whether the federal antitrust statutes have been violated. 
And refusal to do so, therefore, could stem only from a reticence as 
a matter of policy to exercise that power. There are numerous 
examples of such policy-dictated self-restraint.84 What policy 
factors are applicable with respect to the federal antitrust laws? 
The court might desire to effectuate a supposed intent of Congress 
800 (E.D. Pa. 1942), afj'd, 136 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943) (dictum; 
applying state law). Compare Gilbert v. Burnside, 197 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1959), which 
allowed a fiduciary suit based on a similar foreign state statute. 
81 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
82 Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So. 2d 747 (1954); Coeurs D'Alenes Lead Co. v. 
Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938). See Lasser &: Holzman, Personal Liability 
of Directors for Section 102 Surtaxes, The Controller, July, 1948, p. 342; 49 COLUM. L. REv. 
394 (1949); 61 HARV. L. REv. 1058 (1948). A stockholders' derivative suit will lie to 
enjoin excessive accumulations of corporate earnings since such accumulations would 
violate section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and hence constitute a breach 
of the directors' fiduciary duty to the corporation. Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 
N.E.2d 331 (1954); compare Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956), 
holding such an action a private rather than a derivative suit. 
83 Sellers v. Head, supra note 82; Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, supra note 
82. Cf. Hackner v. Van Wyck, 324 Ill. App. 521, 58 N.E.2d 315 (1944). 
84 Illustratively, the United States Supreme Court has uniformly refused to rule on 
state statutes in diversity cases until the highest court of the state has had an opportunity 
to do so. E.g., Louisiana Power&: Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); 
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 
Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942). This policy-based self restraint does not, of course, affect the 
court's ability or duty to take jurisdiction of the diversity suit. Meredith v. ·winter Haven, 
320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943). 
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that the remedies specified in the acts be exclusive.s5 But the 
:fiduciary duty action is not a remedy for an antitrust violation. 
It is, rather, an intracorporate remedy to shift to the wrongdoer 
the injurious consequences of his wrong which would otherw'ise be 
ultimately borne by innocent, wronged parties. An analogy lies in 
the operation of the "negligence per se" rule in tort law.so There 
the plaintiff can rely on the fact of the defendant's violation of a 
criminal statute or ordinance to establish the element of negligence 
essential to his cause of action. And yet surely the legislature en-
acting the criminal statute conceived the state to be the only proper 
moving party and the sanctions provided in the statute to be the 
"exclusive remedies" for a violation thereof. The use of the 
statutes in both instances is not to give a remedy for their violation, 
but rather to supply a necessary element of a separate legal device 
designed to shift to the wrongdoer the injurious consequences of 
an act thereby made wrongful.s7 Another policy which arguably 
85 The remedies specified in the federal antitrust laws are indeed the exclusive reme-
dies for actions arising under those laws. See cases cited in note 39 supra. But this exclu-
sivity relates only to actions under the laws, and can have no legitimate effect on remedies 
-such as the fiduciary duty suit-which exist independently of them. 
"Nothing is found in the federal anti-trust statutes expressly or impliedly providing 
exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts respecting violations of individual, private rights. 
The statutes provide only two civil remedies, i.e. injunctive relief • • • or treble dam-
ages ...• These remedies are not available to plaintiff in a state court action because 
they are cognizable in federal courts exclusively, and the state court has no jurisdiction 
to give relief thereon. But these provisions relate to remedies. It is unreasonable to 
maintain that the anti-trust statutes were intended to exclude persons who had common 
law rights, arising from something also forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the acts, 
from pursuing their remedies in a proper jurisdiction .••• 
"I find no such Congressional intent or expression to such an effect here." Caraway 
v. Ford Motor Co., 148 F. Supp. 776, 777 (W.D. Mo. 1957). 
See also Southern States Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.S.C. 1939); 
Boyd v. New York, N.H & H.R.R., 220 Fed. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); cases cited in note 75 
supra. 
86 See REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Crim-
inal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1932); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes 
to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1933). 
87 While there are analogies, there are also important distinctions between the effect 
of a statutory violation in a fiduciary action, on the one hand, and the effect of such a vio-
lation in an ordinary negligence suit, on the other. For example, in order that the negli-
gence per se doctrine may be invoked the statute in question must have been a criminal 
one, and the plaintiff must have been within the class of persons it was designed to 
protect. REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934). Such limitations do not apply when a statu-
tory violation is offered in a fiduciary duty action as proof of a director's breach of his 
duty to the corporation. The similarities in the two actions are found, rather, in the fact 
that in each the statutory violation plays only an auxiliary or evidentiary role. Spirt v. 
Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956), illustrates the results of failing properly to distin-
guish between the two situations. There the plaintiff stockholder lost his derivative 
fiduciary duty action because the court analyzed the case in terms of negligence per se 
and, finding the plaintiff not to be within the class sought to be protected by the statute 
in question, nonsuited him. That consideration would have been immaterial if the court 
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militates against exercise of the state court's power is that uni-
formity of interpretation of the federal antitrust laws will best be 
achieved by leaving their interpretation solely to the federal 
courts.88 Counterbalanced against this consideration, however, is 
the fact that if the state refused to interpret the federal acts the 
plaintiff would have a clear state law right which the state court 
would be powerless to remedy. Thus although directors injured 
the corporation by federal antitrust law violations, the stock.holders 
would be left totally remediless for losses from a prior adjudica-
tion under the antitrust laws and in all other cases where there 
were no grounds for showing breach of fiduciary duty other than 
in the violation of the statute.89 
The policy question whether the state courts will exercise the 
power they have to interpret the federal antitrust laws, however, 
seems to be settled by a line of cases where state courts have regu-
larly done so. It is established law that a state court will not 
enforce a contract which violates the federal antitrust laws.90 In 
passing on this defense, a number of state courts have necessarily 
and expressly decided the question whether the contract before 
them did in fact violate the acts. 
Another argument which might be urged is that the state court 
will use the federal antitrust laws as shield but not as a sword. The 
distinction is not meritorious. If it means that state courts will 
had analyzed the case with reference to fiduciary duty principles. The same observations 
are applicable to Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944), and Baird v. 
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944). 
88 This consideration was successfully urged, for example, with relation to § 14 of 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958), in 
Investment Associates v. Standard Power &: Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 
(1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (1947) (dictum). 
89 The stockholders may still have an action against the directors under the antitrust 
laws, however, subject to the limitations noted in section II-A of this comment. It should 
also be noted that the threat of such a third-party antitrust action is not sufficient 
grounds for an injunction under the antitrust laws. Fein v. Sec. Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955). 
oo Alpha Beta Food Markets, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal. App.2d 
343, 305 P.2d 163 (1956); Schill v. Remington-Putnam Book Co., 182 Md. 153, 31 A.2d 
467, aff'd on rehearing, 182 Md. 163, 32 A.2d 296 (1943); First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri 
Glass Co., 169 Mo. App. 374, 152 S.W. 378 (1912); General Aniline &: Film Corp. v. 
Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 113 N.E.2d 844 (1953); Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, 
221 N.Y. 507, 116 N.E. 1061 (1917), affirming 162 App. Div. 691, 147 N.Y.S. 532 (1914). 
Cf. A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn&: Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925). Contra, General Talking Pic-
ture Corp. v. DeMarce, 203 Minn. 28, 279 N.W. 750 (1938). Of course, a defendant cannot 
get affirmative relief under the antitrust laws by way of counterclaim in a state action. 
Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corp. v. H. Wales Lines Co., 119 Conn. 603, 178 Atl. 659 (1935); 
Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 237 La. 132, 110 So. 2d 553 (1959). See generally 5 
WILLJSION, CONTRACTS §§ 1628-64 (1937); Lockhart, Violation of the Antitrust Laws as a 
Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REv. 507 (1947). 
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refuse to enforce the antitrust laws it is a mere truism.01 If it 
means that a state court will ascertain the illegality of certain 
conduct under the federal antitrust laws as a substantive element 
of a defense in an action unrelated to those laws but not as sub-
stantive element of a cause of action which is equally unrelated to 
those laws, it is a distinction without a substantial basis. Uni-
formity of interpretation and exclusivity of remedies, the policy 
factors primarily applicable to this question which turns only on 
policy, are no more frustrated when the state court interprets the 
antitrust laws at the behest of the plaintiff than when it does so for 
the defendant.02 The state courts have, therefore, the power to 
use the federal antitrust laws in the manner urged, as a matter of 
policy they should exercise this power, and in fact they do so in 
closely analogous contexts. The final question is whether federally-
created illegality as well as illegality by reference to state law is of 
the quality which a state court will find to constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty. The answer to this question is in the affirmative.03 
4. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.04 The Simon case im-
plicitly affirms the above contentions. While the case unfortu-
nately stands alone among state court authority it has never been 
overruled or criticized and, hence, would seem to represent good 
law.05 The Socony-Vacuum Company and its directors were con-
victed of violating the Sherman Act.00 As a result, great loss was 
suffered by the corporation in the form of fines, treble damages, 
and litigation expenses. Minority stockholders brought a deriva-
tive fiduciary suit in a New York court to hold directors liable to 
the corporation for such losses on the ground that they caused the 
corporation to violate the federal antitrust law in breach of their 
fiduciary duties. The defendants, in effect, conceded the illegality 
of their acts.97 Thus the court was spared the necessity of deter-
91 See cases cited in note 38 supra. 
02 Indeed, in one case a plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a contract was 
unenforceable on the ground that it violated the federal antitrust laws. Defendant de-
murred, contending that jurisdiction lay exclusively in the federal courts. The court 
held for plaintiff, construing the federal statutes in light of federal cases. Alpha Beta 
Food Markets v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal. App.2d 343, 305 P.2d 163 (1956). 
03 See cases cited in note 75 supra. 
94179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). 
95 The effect of Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc. 996, 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. 
Ct. 1946), is hard to determine. The brief opinion cites with approval the Simon case 
but is too cryptic to shed much light. 
96 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
97 "That the defendant corporation participated in the unlawful buying program is 
not disputed. Nor is it questioned that the defendants, as directors, participated therein in 
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mining a violation. But since res judicata was not raised by the 
situation, the court, in entering jurisdiction, must have held that 
it had the power to adjudicate the fact of violation. The direc-
tors' conduct which was found illegal consisted of engaging in a 
buying program which very competent counsel98 advised them was 
legal. Indeed, the majority of the Second Circuit99 and even two 
members of the Supreme Court agreed.100 The court, therefore, 
properly found for the defendants on the ground that the direc-
tors did not know their acts were illegal and could not, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, have known this. But the court by 
entertaining the fiduciary action based on a federal antitrust viola-
tion confirmed the holdings of the Hand and Guiterman cases that 
this type of action will lie in a state court. 
D. Policy Considerations 
The federal antitrust laws are extremely general. It is often 
difficult for an honest businessman acting with utmost good faith 
to stay within the laws, even with the aid of competent counsel.101 
While these considerations should not affect the legal question 
whether the fiduciary suit will lie, they should be carefully taken 
into account by a court entertaining such an action in deciding 
whether the directors or officers knew or should have known that 
their conduct violated the antitrust laws. The reasoning of the 
court in the Simon case is instructive in this regard: 
"It is elementary that directors owe a corporation the duty 
to exercise reasonable care in managing its affairs. . . . 
"At most [the facts show the directors] ... made an honest 
and reasonable mistake or error of judgment or of law .... 
"But it is argued that defendants are liable because they 
committed acts prohibited by statute . . . even though they 
acted in good faith and with reasonable care .... 
behalf of the corporation." Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203, 38 
N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (Sup. Ct. 194-2), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). 
98 Failure to consult counsel may be evidence of negligence but is not conclusive. 
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
90 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1939). 
100 Justices Roberts and McReynolds, dissenting, felt the conduct complained of was 
legal under the Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 254 
(1940). 
101 "[I]t must be confessed that there is no consistent or intelligible policy embodied 
in our law by which •.• business men may distinguish bona fide pursuit of industrial 
efficiency from an illicit program of industrial empire building." Jackson & Dumbauld, 
Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 231, 237 (1938). 
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"The rule is too broadly stated. . . . 
"If the liability of a corporate officer is based on the . . . 
violation of a statute ... the test of reasonable care ... applies 
. . . [only] in so far as such care bears on whether he should 
have known that the acts in question were ultra vires or ex-
pressly forbidden .... 
"It seems to follow that, as the defendants ... did not know 
or believe or have reason to believe that their participation in 
the buying program was prohibited by the Sherman Act, they 
cannot be held personally liable for damages."102 
The staggering amount of the potential liability under statutes 
which provide for treble damages and fines and which involve 
great litigation expenses underscores the need for scrupulous at-
tention to the issue of fault in the fiduciary suit. Personal liability 
should, therefore, be restricted to three types of situations: (1) 
Where the directors or officers knowingly violated the antitrust 
laws, (2) where they have acted in bad faith, and (3) absent 
scienter or bad faith, only where their acts constituted a per se vio-
lation of the antitrust laws.103 Only in the latter case is the anti-
trust law clear enough to predicate liability on negligence in not 
having known that the given conduct was prohibited. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fanchon & Marco case has made it clear that a stock.hold-
ers' derivative suit will lie under the antitrust laws to redress, by 
treble damages and injunctive relief, injury caused to the corpo-
ration by the anti-competitive effects of an antitrust violation. 
Various requirements of corporation law and antitrust law, how-
ever, limit the availability of such a suit to the case where at least 
one of the antitrust violators dominates the stock.holders' corpora-
tion. 
Where a corporation's management causes it to violate the fed-
eral antitrust laws and the corporation is forced to pay fines or 
102 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203-05, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273.74 
(Sup. Ct. 1942), afj'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). Two writers have 
assumed that proof of a violation of the antitrust statutes would per se constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 5 STAN. L. REv. 480 (1953); 36 G1::o. L.J. 441 (1948). This 
assumption overlooks the marked difference between these two concepts illustrated in the 
text in section II-A-I and by the language quoted from the Simon case. 
103 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE 
ANrrmUST LAws 12 (1955). 
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damages and litigation expenses, a stockholders' derivative suit will 
lie to hold the directors personally liable to the corporation. Such 
an action lies not under the federal antitrust laws but rather upon 
the basis that causing such a violation is a breach of management's 
fiduciary duty to the corporation. Personal liability should be re-
stricted, however, to cases where the individuals involved knew, 
or because of the per se nature of the violation should have known, 
that they were violating the law. The conviction of certain cor-
porate officers in the recent electrical industry conspiracy cases is 
perhaps illustrative of this type of violation. When one considers 
the possible magnitude of the liability of such officers in a fiduciary 
duty action, the potential impact of the fiduciary duty action as it 
relates to the federal antitrust laws can readily be appreciated. 
William Y. Webb, S.Ed. 
